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MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM
"'... With liberty and justice for all."'
E pluribus unum.2
Equal Justice Under Law.3
Themes of unity and equality such as these echo throughout
early American writings, as supporters of the newly formed
federal government molded thirteen rebellious, independent col-
onies into a cohesive whole. The problem of fragmentation
plagued the founders of the American legal system as they
struggled toward wholeness, and these words assured everyone
that justice would be dispensed evenly. Although the founders
focused on the unification and equal treatment of several states
and many individuals, similar concerns surface when many
people are housed within one, as is the case of those who suffer
from multiple personality disorder.
4
Those afflicted with multiple personality disorder (Multiples)
become entangled with the criminal justice system as victims
1. This comes from the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America. See 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1988).
2. The motto on the national seal translates from Latin as "Out of Many,
One." See 140 CONG. REc. S635 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
3. These words appear on the facade of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Washington, D.C.
4. One psychiatrist defined multiple personality disorder as follows:
What is MPD [multiple personality disorder]? MPD is a little girl
imagining that the abuse is happening to someone else. This is
the core of the disorder, to which all other features are secondary.
The imagining is so intense, subjectively compelling, and adaptive,
that the abused child experiences dissociated aspects of herself as
other people. It is this core characteristic of MPD that makes it
a treatable disorder, because the imagining can be unlearned, and
the past confronted and mastered.
COLiN A. Ross, MULTIPLE PERSONALTrrY DIsoanER: DUGNosIs, CLINCAL FEA-
TuRnS, & TREATMENT 55-56 (1989).
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and perpetrators of felonies.5 Although on different sides of the
criminal justice system, Multiple victims and Multiple felons
share similar problems. This Note evaluates the legal system's
treatment of Multiple victims and felons and highlights the
differences and similarities between their treatment and that of
non-Multiple 6 victims and felons. Part I discusses the psycho-
logical and legal background of multiple personality disorder
and the insanity defense. Part II considers the philosophical and
legal issues that the presence of a Multiple victim in the legal
system raises. Part III discusses the ramifications and dilemmas
the legal system faces with respect to Multiple defendants. Part
IV argues that despite the sometimes unique problems Multiples
suffer, they should not receive special treatment per se because
of their condition.
I. HISTORY
A. Psychological Details of Multiple Personality Disorder
Multiple personality disorder (MPD)7 is a dissociative disorder8
in which the normally integrated identity and consciousness
5. Multiples are involved in many crimes and legal problems that are not
felonies, and thus beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Gooden v. Howard
County, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992) (dismissing a civil rights action in which
police apprehended a woman for an emergency psychiatric evaluation because
they concluded she was Multiple); Wheeler v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1233 (8th
Cir. 1989) (concerning the denial of Social Security benefits to a woman who
alleged she was Multiple); State v. Summers, 614 P.2d 925 (Haw. 1980)
(concerning the defense of a person with multiple personality disorder for
carrying a firearm without a permit); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stevenson,
356 So.2d 408 (La. 1978) (suspending an attorney with multiple personality
disorder who was convicted of credit card fraud); In re Michel, 549 N.E.2d
440 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (terminating father's custody of his children because
he had MPD and had exhibited some violent conduct); Lovelace v. Keohane,
831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992) (determining that MPD is not a legal disability for
tolling the statute of limitations in a personal injury case when the victim had
been sexually abused but did not recall the abuse until 20 years later in
therapy); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 414 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 1992) (evaluating
whether a Multiple who has intercourse with a man who is not her husband
while under control of an alter personality is actually committing adultery);
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991)(revoking the license of a nurse who had consensual sex with a Multiple
patient).
6. The term "non-Multiples" refers to individuals who are not diagnosed
as having MPD.
7. The leading psychiatric diagnostic manual contains the basic definition
of multiple personality disorder:
The essential feature is the existence within the individual of
two or more distinct personalities, each of which is dominant at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/12
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functions are suddenly and temporarily altered.9 In essence,
separate and distinct alternative personalities '° inhabit one body,
usually without the knowledge" of the "host personality."'' 2 The
disorder is dramatic because personalities are often opposites.' 3
a particular time. Each personality is a fully integrated and com-
plex unit with unique memories, behavior patterns, and social
relationships that determine the nature of the individual's acts
when that personality is dominant. Transition from one personality
to another is sudden and often associated with psychosocial stress.
Usually the original personality has no knowledge or awareness
of the existence of any of the other personalities (subpersonalities).
When there are more than two personalities in one individual,
each is aware of the others to varying degrees. The subpersonalities
may not know each other or be constant companions. At any
given moment one personality will interact verbally with the ex-
ternal environment, but none or any number of other personalities
may actively perceive . . . all that is going on.
The original personality and all of the subpersonalities are aware
of lost periods of time .... [They] frequently seem to be oppos-
ites .... Usually one of the personalities over the course of the
disorder is dominant.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 257 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
There are two diagnostic criteria for MPD:
A. The existence within the person of two or more distinct
personalities or personality states (each with its own relatively
enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the
environment and self).
B. At least two of these personalities or personality states recur-
rently take full control of the person's behavior.
AMERIcAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 272 (rev. 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. "Per-
sonality states" are "not exhibited in as wide a range of contexts" as
personality traits. Id. at 269. See infra note 10 and accompanying text for a
definition of "personality traits."
8. Dissociative disorders involve "a sudden alteration in consciousness
affecting memory and identity." GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ExPERImENTAL CLINICAL APPROACH 60 (4th ed.
1986).
9. Id. at 156. See generally THOMAS F. OLTMANNS ET AL., CASE STUDIES
IN ABNORmAL PSYCHOLOGY 57-76 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the etiology and
evolution of the disorder).
10. "Personality traits are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and
thinking about the environment and oneself, and are exhibited in a wide range
of important social and personal contexts." DSM-III-R, supra note 7, at 305
(emphasis omitted).
11. A patient's complaints of amnesia and of lost time are particularly
useful cues in diagnosing MPD as the appropriate disorder. Ross, supra note
4, at 102.
12. The host personality is the personality that controls the body most of
the time. RAY ALDRIDGE-MoRRIs, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY: AN EXERCISE IN
DECEPTION 9 (1989).
13. Some believe that the role of the separate personalities is to fill any
26319941
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For example, if one personality is reclusive and shy, another
may be boisterous and rowdy. 14 Although the vast majority of
multiples are female, 15 the personalities need not be the same
gender: they may not even be the same age or race, nor will
they necessarily wear the same eyeglasses prescription or have
the same handwriting. 6 The average number of personalities is
eight, 17 but there may be anywhere from two to hundreds.,' The
transformation from one personality to another can occur upon
request or without warning. Indeed, the manifestations of MPD
are so unusual that claims of MPD frequently encourage dis-
belief. 19
The historical origins of diagnosis of MPD are unclear.20 The
disorder was first noted clinically in 1646 when a woman claimed
that another personality had stolen her money and that she
could recall nothing of the incident.2' Medical literature infre-
quently documented the disorder during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, though some scholars argue that
earlier cases were mistaken for demonic possession.22 After an
initial series of MPD diagnoses, however, the numbers declined
gaps or weaknesses in the individual's character. EUGENE L. BLISS, MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY, ALLIED DISORDER, AND HYPNOSIS 129-33 (1986).
14. Martin T. Orne "et al., On the Differential Diagnosis of Multiple
Personality in the Forensic Context, 32 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 118, 120 (1984).
15. One author estimated that 85% of Multiples are female. Robert M.
Greenberg, Traumatic Origins of Multiple Personality Disorder, 32 TRAUMA
17, 18 (1991). Contra Ross, supra note 4, at 68 (estimating that in the public
setting the ratio of women to men with the syndrome is closer to 1:1).
According to the literature on the subject, though, nearly all criminal defen-
dants who maintain that they are Multiples are male. Ralph B. Allison, The
Multiple Personality Defendant in Court, 3 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 181,
183 (1982/83).
16. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 18.
17. Id.
18. BLISS, supra note 13, at 129.
19. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of
malingering, one oft-proposed alternative diagnosis to MPD.
20. See generally Ross, supra note 4, at 9-44 (describing the history of
dissociation and fragmentation of the self beginning with ancient Egypt and
continuing through the twentieth century). This Note assumes that MPD exists
as a psychiatric condition. There is, however, an ongoing debate in the
psychological community about whether the condition actually exists. See Elyn
R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 383, 400-03 (1992) (noting the conflict over the existence of
MPD and evaluating each viewpoint).
21. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 17.
22. Saks, supra note 20, at 389-90. See also Ross, supra note 4, at 17-27
(describing the history of demonic possession and comparing it to MPD).
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until the 1970s.3 Current levels of diagnoses no longer reflect
that decline; at least two to three times as many cases of MPD
have been documentedu in the last twenty years25 than in the
time prior to 1970.6 The reasons why so many more cases of
MPD have appeared recently is not clear; it could simply be
that the psychiatric community knows more about the disorder,
or it could involve other cultural phenomena. 27
The etiology of MPD is believed to be rooted in childhood
when a child suffers severe and often repeated physical, sexual,
23. Saks, supra note 20, at 390. This decline corresponded with the advent
of the term "schizophrenic," and the two disorders are frequently confused.
DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 8, at 158 n.5. But see ALDRIDGE-MOpRRS, supra
note 12, at 32-33 (arguing that MPD is rarely confused with schizophrenia).
Schizophrenia is defined broadly as a split between cognition and affect with
a variety of symptoms, including but not limited to thought disorders and
delusional perceptions. DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 8, at 158. Unlike
schizophrenia, MPD is characterized by distinct personality traits that have
no dissociation of thoughts and emotions. Ralph Slovenko, The Multiple
Personality: A Challenge to Legal Concepts, 17 J. PsYcHIATRY & L. 681, 684-
85 (1989). See generally DAVisoN & NEALE, supra note 8, at 333-66 (providing
a basic background on schizophrenia).
24. One expert noted that he saw more than 100 cases in a 5-year span.
BLISS, supra note 13, at 118.
25. The vast majority of MPD cases have been diagnosed in the United
States. ALDRIDGE-MORRIS, supra note 12, at 15-16.
26. Orne, supra note 14, at 119. Some observers question the therapist's
role in conjunction with the current numbers of diagnosed Multiples, Id.
Therapy for the disorder usually involves hypnosis, and some argue that
psychologists and other hypnotists may be intentionally or unintentionally
planting the hypnotic suggestion that the subject is Multiple. Id.
27. Since 1980, the number of diagnosed MPD cases in the United States
has risen from 200 to 6000. Slovenko, supra note 23, at 686. In the United
Kingdom, however, an informal survey found only six tentative diagnoses
prior to 1987. ALDRMGE-MORRIs, supra note 12, at 15. Aldridge-Morris went
so far as to imply that the plethora of Multiples in America, compared with
their absence in the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, and
Australia is actually a cultural phenomenon. Id. at 109. He commented that
Americans are particularly prone to role-playing and modeling themselves after
psychotherapists and movie stars. Id. He further noted that public awareness
about the syndrome in the United States is very high because of films such
as Sybil (NBC television broadcast, 1976) (portraying the life of a woman
with multiple personalities) and THE THREE FACES OF EVE (Twentieth-Century
Fox 1957) (documenting the diagnosis of a multiple). ALDRIDGE-MORRs, supra
note 12, at 109. Indeed, an American newsletter called Speaking for Ourselves
purports to be by, for, and about people with multiple personalities. Id. at
3. Aldridge-Morris concluded that such awareness both on the part of the
public and the professionals in such a climate has lead to a romanticization
of the disorder and a propensity for its frequent diagnosis. Id. at 109. Ross,
on the other hand, contended that the fragmented and dualistic nature of
western culture contributes to the appearance of MPD. Ross, supra note 4,
at 177-83.
1994]
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or psychological abuse.2 A child as young as two can manifest
symptoms of the syndrome.29 Theoretically, the abuse and trauma
cause the child to seek people within herself to protect and
rescue her.3 0 The child enters a fantasy world to separate herself
from the pain of the real world .3 Not all abused children develop
the syndrome. Other factors come into play at times, but, as
yet, psychologists have not identified those factors with any
certainty.32 Some maintain that every person has a continuum
of personalities and that some days one is not quite oneself. 3
Children are especially subject to sudden shifts in affect and
attitude. For example, it is normal for children to have imaginary
companions who provide support and friendship for the chil-
dren.34 Only the continuation of an imaginary companion and
protector into adolescence and adulthood is cause for concern.35
MPD is, therefore, a maladaption of a normal continuum. 6
28. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 18.
29. Id. Very few children have been diagnosed with MPD. Ross, supra
note 4, at 200. The rarity of diagnosis, however, does not indicate that few
children have multiple personalities; on the contrary, the problem seems to be
the difficulty clinicians have in identifying the features in young children. Id.
at 201. In the few cases on record, short-term treatment has been successful
in creating long-term stable remission - so long as the child has been removed
from the abusive situation. Id. See generally Deni Elliot, State Intervention
and Childhood Multiple Personality Disorder, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 441
(1982) (arguing that because at least 80% of all children suffering from the
disorder have been physically abused, and at least 79% of all children suffering
from the disorder have been sexually abused, a diagnosis of MPD in a child
should automatically trigger intervention and removal of the child pending a
full investigation of the home).
30. As a result, the host personality is most often timid and reclusive,
while the secondary personalities are more aggressive and hostile. Felicia G.
Rubenstein, Note, Committing Crimes While Experiencing a True Dissociative
State: The Multiple Personality Defense and Appropriate Criminal Responsi-
bility, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 361-62 (1991).
31. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 18-19.
32. Id. at 18.
33. DAvisoN & NEALE, supra note 8, at 157. One could argue that because
everyone has extreme personality swings and can enter mental states in which
their actions are not typical, every person is Multiple. The law recognizes that
sometimes a perpetrator is "not himself." Murder can be reduced, in some
jurisdictions, to voluntary manslaughter upon a showing that the perpetrator
acted in the heat of passion or in intense emotional excitement. See State v.
Guebara, 696 P.2d 381, 385-86 (Kan. 1985) (describing the necessary factors
for a finding of voluntary manslaughter based on emotional distress).
34. Ross, supra note 4, at 107.
35. Id.
36. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 18-19. See also Slovenko, supra note 23,
at 703-06 (discussing the various ways in which most people split personalities
and how such instances appear in literature and history).
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Psychotherapists treat the disorder primarily through extensive
psychoanalysis and hypnosis.3 7 A close therapist-patient relation-
ship is required, precluding group therapy.38 Nothing currently
known suggests that MPD is chemically related; therefore, phar-
macological treatment is useless.3 9 Hypnosis, however, is helpful
to a certain degree.40 Under hypnosis, the therapist is likely to
discover additional personalities who are more willing to appear
and to speak to the therapist while the Multiple is in a suggestive
state. 4' Hypnosis, therefore, is a useful means of diagnosing as
well as treating the syndrome. 42 Because of amnesia, 43 the pri-
mary personality may be unaware of the other personalities
within, and hypnosis or sodium amytal44 can be useful in re-
moving the block. 45 The goal of therapy is successful reintegra-
tion of several personalities into one.46 Despite an average therapy
length of six years,4 7 the prognosis for those with MPD is not
promising. With the proper combination of psychotherapy,48
37. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 20.
38. Id. Of course, given the number of individuals involved in the therapy
of a Multiple, group therapy of a sort is exactly what happens. Id.
39. Id. Drugs can be useful in treating symptoms in some of the alter
personalities. Id. For example, if one personality is depressed, antidepressants
might alter that condition, but not all of the personalities will necessarily react
the same way to the drug. Id. A cyclical pattern of over and underdosing the
Multiple could be the result of any drug regime. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 20.
43. See Daniel L. Schacter, Amnesia and Crime: How Much Do We Really
Know?, 41 AM. PSYCHOL. 286 (1986) (discussing the recurrent appearance of
amnesia in criminal cases and how to evaluate amnesia).
44. Sodium amytal and sodium pentothal administered intravenously are
commonly known as truth serum. Although many people believe that lying is
impossible while under the influence of a drug or hypnosis induced trance,
that is not true. See Martin T. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in
Court, 27 INT'L J. CLmncA. & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 313 (1979). These
techniques, however, are useful in enhancing the witness' memory or deter-
mining the state of mind at the time of the event in question. Id.
45. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 20. Use of hypnosis and truth serum of
any kind raises legal questions about the admissibility of evidence. See generally
Orne, supra note 44, at 311 (discussing the role of hypnosis in treatment of
amnesia and the evidentiary problems of admitting hypnotically or chemically
induced or enhanced evidence).
46. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 20. But see CHRIs C. SIZEMORE & ELEN
S. PITTLLO, I'M EVE 411-61 (1977) (noting that in the case of at least one
Multiple, "success" meant integrating many personalities into relatively few
and trying to live with those few).
47. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 20.
48. Psychotherapy is defined as "[a] primarily verbal means of helping
troubled individuals change their thoughts, feelings, and behavior to reduce
distress .. .. " DAvISON & NEALE, supra note 8, at G15.
19941 267
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psychoanalysis, 49 and hypnotherapy, only one-third to one-half
of Multiple patients' conditions significantly improve. 0
B. A Brief History of the Insanity Defense
Defendants in the criminal justice system who suffer from
MPD are likely to rely on the insanity5' defense.5 2 The concept
of acquittal by reason of insanity lies in the fundamental belief
that a civilized society does not punish those who are incapable
of controlling their behavior. 3
Historically, courts have applied several different forms of
the insanity test. In the eighteenth century, the standard for
insanity was whether the defendant could distinguish between
good and evil and whether he knew the difference between right
and wrong.54 In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten was found not guilty
by reason of insanity after shooting and killing the private
secretary of the Prime Minister of England.5 5 This case estab-
lished a rule that created a presumption of sanity unless the
defendant could clearly prove that when the crime occurred,
"[Tihe accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
49. Psychoanalysis is defined as "[a] term applied primarily to the therapy
procedures pioneered by [Sigmund] Freud, entailing free association, dream
interpretation, and working through the transference neurosis. More recently
the term has come to encompass the numerous variations on basic Freudian
therapy." Id. (emphasis omitted).
50. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 20. For a more thorough discussion of
possible methods of treatment, see generally Ross, supra note 4, at 191-309.
51. Insanity is a legal concept, not a psychological concept. LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 264 (1987).
52. See generally Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity
Defense" - Why Not?, in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY 407, 411-19 (Abraham
S. Goldstein" & Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971) (analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of the insanity defense and the role it plays in the criminal justice
system); RALPH REisNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS (2d ed. 1990) (documenting the
history of the insanity plea).
53. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 51, at 263-64. Insanity is an important
question at several stages of a criminal defense: (1) at the time of the crime,
the defendant must have the required mens rea; (2) at arraignment, the
defendant must be able to understand the charges and plead intelligently; (3)
at and during trial, the defendant must be able to assist with his defense; (4)
at allocution, the defendant should be able to respond if possible to stay the
execution of the sentence; and (5) at the time of execution, the defendant
must understand why execution is occurring. RONALD N. BOYCE & ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDtIuE 617-18 (7th ed. 1989).
54. WRiGHTSMAN, supra note 51, at 264. Unlike today, the courts at that
time assumed that juries could decide conclusively if the defendant was sane.
Id.
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of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know what he was doing was wrong." ' 56 This test is essentially
knowing right from wrong.
In 1954, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
established a new standard in Durham v. United States.5 7 The
new standard did not hold the accused criminally responsible if
the unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect.18
After criticism that the Durham rule was too broad and placed
too much emphasis on the psychiatric experts, the American
Law Institute (ALI) in 1962 promulgated a standard of insanity
combining the M'Naghten rule with an "irresistible impulse"
test.5 9 Under this test, the accused was not responsible for
criminal conduct if, because of mental disease or defect, the
defendant lacked the "substantial capacity" to either appreciate
the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the
requirements of the law.60 The ALI rule thus combines the
M'Naghten test of knowing right from wrong with an inability
to control one's acts.
After John Hinckley, Jr. successfully pled not guilty by reason
of insanity to the attempted assassination of President Ronald
Reagan,6' Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984,612 which states that if, when the crime was perpetrated, a
defendant was "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts," they can be judged insane. 63 This
56. Id. at 265. As recently as 1987, 21 states still employed the M'Naghten
standard. Id. at 267. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, M'Naghten: The
Stereotype Challenged, in CsndE, LAW, AND SociTY, supra note 52, at 387(analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the M'Naghten rule as it is used
in modern times).
57. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
58. WiucInrsmN, supra note 51, at 266. The Durham rule, however, had
several loopholes: alcoholics, drug addicts, and compulsive gamblers used the
defense. Id. at 267.
59. Id. at 267-68. An irresistible impulse is when the perpetrator's mental
condition inhibits his reasoning ability to such a degree that he cannot resist
committing the deed, even if he knows it to be wrong. Id. at 265 (citing Smith
v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929)). See also Rubenstein, supra
note 30, at 356-59 (recounting the history of the insanity defense).
60. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 51, at 267. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)
(Prop. Official Draft 1962 & Rev. Cmts. 1985). The Model Code excludes
"abnormalit[ies] manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct." Id. § 4.01(2).
61. See PETER Low ET AL., TiE TRIAL OF JoHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A
CASE STUny IN THE INSAmTY DEFENSE (1986) (excerpting sections of the
1-finckley trial and analyzing the use of the insanity defense).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). The Act in part responded to the public outrage
regarding the verdict. Low, supra note 61, at 126-27.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988). In the House of Representatives Report on
1994]
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test drops the irresistible impulse component and returns essen-
tially to the M'Naghten rule.
Each of the traditional standards for insanity concur that an
inability to distinguish right from wrong constitutes insanity.
Each further requires this inability to stem from a mental defect
or disease. The changes in the standard reflect an ongoing debate
as to whether the additional prong of irresistible impulse should
be necessary for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
II. MuLTrPL~s IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Case Studies of Multiple as Victims
Presumably, people who suffer from multiple personality dis-
order are victims of crime in the same proportion as everyone
else." Given, however, the relative rarity of the disorder, few
cases involve Multiples as victims of crime.
the Act, the Committee stated:
Although abuses of the insanity defense are few and have an
insignificant direct impact upon the criminal justice system, the
Committee nevertheless concluded that the present defense and
the procedures surrounding its use are in need of reform .... The
insanity defense has an impact on the criminal justice system that
goes beyond the actual cases involved. The use of the defense in
highly publicized cases, and the myths surrounding its use, have
undermined public faith in the criminal justice system.
H.R. REP. No. 577, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1983) (footnote omitted),
reprinted in Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism My-
thology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 599,
647 (1989-90) (emphasis omitted). See also Low, supra note 61, at 126-37
(analyzing the legislation); ill 0. Radwin, Note, The Multiple Personality
Disorder: Has This Trendy Alibi Lost Its Way?, 15 L. & PsYcHoL. Rv. 331,
358-61 (1991) (analyzing the history of the insanity defense and noting various
state statutes concerning insanity). Several states have eliminated the insanity
defense and others have created the verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI).
Low, supra note 61, at 130-35. GBMI procedures vary from state to state.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(reviewing a GBMI plea). For a discussion of the burden of proof and
presumption of sanity, see Tanner v. State, 265 A.2d 573, 577-78 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1970).
For a thorough discussion of GBMI, see generally Ira Mickenberg, A
Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded
in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the
Insanity Defense, 55 U. Cni. L. REv. 943 (1987).
64. In a different twist, one criminal defendant argued on appeal that his
conviction should be overturned because his defense attorney allegedly suffered
from MPD and therefore failed to represent him adequately at his robbery
trial. State v. Evans, No. 02c01-9205-CR-00109, 1993 WL 460555 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Nov. 10, 1993). The court found no evidence that the attorney was
Multiple or that she was incompetent. Id. at *4.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/12
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In one case, Mark Peterson was convicted of second-degree
sexual assault for having intercourse with a woman, Sarah, who
had MPD.65 Wisconsin law makes it illegal to have sex with a
mentally ill person who is unable to appreciate the consequences
of the conduct.66 This case may have been the first time MPD
was used as a grounds for prosecution. 7 The victim alleged that
one of her personalities, twenty-year-old Jennifer, had inter-
course with the defendant." She further alleged that neither
Sarah nor most of the other personalties knew of the act at the
time." According to Jennifer, the other personalities learned
after the fact from six-year-old Emily, who had been present, 70
that Peterson had deliberately called forth the naive Jennifer
who enjoyed having fun but had "no understanding of sex. ' ' 7'
Although this case was tried under a specific statute prohibiting
intercourse with a mentally ill person when the defendant knows
of the condition,7 2 it raises the question of how the law should
approach cases in which one personality invites or provokes an
action and the other personalities do not consent.
For example, in State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court,73 the
defendant was charged with stabbing her husband whom she
alleged had MPD.7 4 She asserted that at the time of the assault,
65. Charles-Edward Anderson, Uninformed Consent: Jury Convicts Man
for Sex with Mentally Ill Woman, 77 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 28 (citing State
v. Peterson, No. 90-CF-280 (Winnebago County Ct., Wis. Nov. 8, 1990)).
The conviction was reversed on the grounds that the defense did not properly
pursue a request for a psychiatric examination of the victim. Multiple-Person-
alities Case: Retrial Ordered, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1990, at B1. The case
was dropped, allegedly in the best interest of the victim, because after the
case became public her personalities increased from 21 to 46. Desda Moss,
Personalities Case Is Closed, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1990, at 2A. Subsequent
allegations have been made that the prosecutor brought the case to trial for
publicity reasons and that he knew the key witness also had sex with the
victim. ArLynn Leiber Presser, Publicity and Justice: Rape Conviction Over-
turned Amid Allegations of Prosecutorial Impropriety, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1991,
at 20.
66. Presser, supra note 65, at 20.
67. Carol J. Castaneda, Multiple-Personality Case: Guilty, USA TODAY,
Nov. 9, 1990, at 3A.
68. Anderson, supra note 65, at 28.
69. Cynthia Gorney, Man Guilty in Multiple Personality Rape Case; Osh-
kosh Jury: He Knew Victim Was 11, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1990, at C1
[hereinafter Man Guilty].
70. Charles Bremner, 'Three Sarahs' Rape Case Verdict, Tim TImEs (Lon-
don), Nov. 9, 1990, at 13.
71. Man Guilty, supra note 69, at CI.
72. Cynthia Gorney, Sarah's Story: Voices from a Fractured Past -
Wisconsin Woman Describes the Origin of Her Selves, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
1990, at D1 [hereinafter Sarah's Story].
73. 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
74. Id. at 447.
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her husband was manifesting a violent alter personality, and
that she acted in self-defense. 75 This case raises the questions of
what protections to afford a victim with multiple personalities.7 6
The legal system does not deliberately treat victims who have
MPD differently from other victims: no provisions specifically
state that if the victim is a Multiple, the court should follow
certain procedures. When, however, as in the Wisconsin rape
case, the victim's disorder is the basis for the criminal prose-
cution or, as in Romley, the victim's disorder is the basis of
the defendant's affirmative defense, special questions are raised.
B. Legal Problems Involving the Multiple Victim
Although relatively few crime victims are Multiples, they too
can be victimized, and when they are, it creates different prob-
lems for the justice system than when non-Multiples are victim-
ized.
First is the problem of testimony. Often the victim is called
to testify about the crime, but when the victim is a Multiple,
complications arise. Because the host personality often has am-
nesia regarding the other personalities and their actions, the host
personality will not be able to testify first-hand about the crime.
If able to testify at all, the host personality will be relaying
what the other personalties have told them, which is essentially
hearsay. 77 Logistical complications also can occur if the person-
alities change while on the stand.7 8 Aside from the confusion
this may cause for the jurors, it also raises the problem of what
happens if the transformations occur without warning and the
75. Id.
76. Id. at 450-54.
77. Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Although the rules discuss the definition of "statement"
extensively, Rule 801(a) and the Advisory Committee's Note fail to address
the definition of "declarant" as thoroughly. The definition of "personhood,"
then, remains open for debate. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text
for further discussion of the concept of personhood. See generally James
Allan, The Working and Rationale of the Hearsay Rule and the Inplications
of Modern Psychological Knowledge, 44 CUR RNT LEGAm PROBS. 217 (1991)
(analyzing the hearsay rule and its conflict with psychology, and rethinking
the rule in general).
78. The court in State v. Johnson, No. 90-CF-280 (Winnebago County
Ct., Wis. Nov. 8, 1990), dealt with that problem by summoning six different
personalities to testify and swearing in each personality as they appeared. See
Castaneda, supra note 67, at 3A; Sarah's Story, supra note 72, at Dl. For
further discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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now-evident personality does not know what just happened& 9
Further complicating the situation, each personality on the stand
needs to establish that he or she can testify truthfully.80
Second, the very essence of some crimes depends on the
victim's state of mind.81 In State v. Johnson,8 2 a jury convicted
the defendant because the jury believed that the defendant knew
Sarah suffered from MPD 83 and that he deliberately manipulated
her personalities to convince her to have intercourse.8 This
defendant violated a law prohibiting sexual contact with a known
mentally ill person.85 But what if a man had consensual sex with
a woman whom he did not know had MPD, and the other
personalities considered it rape?8 6 Would it be rape if several
79. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text for further analysis of
this situation.
80. "[B]efore testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind
with the duty to do so." FED. R. Evm. 603. Again, resolution of this problem
depends in part upon the definition of personhood. See infra notes 114-17
and accompanying text. If one accepts that each personality can testify as an
independent entity - and thus avoid the hearsay problems - each personality
must meet the criteria for competence as described in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 601-604.
81. Felonies are usually less dependent upon the victim's state of mind
than are nonfelonies like false imprisonment - with the major exception of
the varying degrees of sexual assault. But cf. Hurley v. State, 483 A.2d 1298
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (analyzing the defendant's argument that the state
must produce his wife's body to prove he murdered her because, given that
she was Multiple and hence capable of disappearing without warning or even
of committing suicide, she may not even have been murdered).
82. No. 90-CF-280 (Winnebago County Ct., Wis., Nov. 8, 1990). See supra
notes 65-72 & 78 and accompanying text for more on this case.
83. Actually, some of the jurors were not completely certain that Sarah
was Multiple, but they were convinced that she was mentally ill. Man Guilty,
supra note 69, at Cl.
84. See supra text accompanying note 71.
85. See supra text accompanying note 66 for the substance of the Wisconsin
law.
86. Such a situation would be unlikely to result in a conviction because
most statutes and the common law maintain that consent is an affirmative
defense to rape. BOYCE & PERUCs, supra note 53, at 144. If the man had no
idea that the woman had MPD, he would have no way of knowing from
whom to obtain the consent. See People v. Davis, 301 N.W.2d 871 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980). In Davis, the court evaluated language in a Michigan statute
stating that third degree sexual conduct with a mentally defective person
required that the defendant "knows or has reason to know" that his partner
is mentally defective. Id. at 873 n.l. The court concluded that the legislature
included this language to protect individuals who have sex with apparently
competent partners only to find out later that the partner was mentally ill.
Id. at 873. In reaching this conclusion, the court posited a hypothetical in
which "a woman who suffers from multiple personality defect might seem
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personalities refused repeatedly, but another personality ap-
peared suddenly, consented to sex, then departed as the act
began?87 In all of these situations, the man would have a good
argument that the consent of one personality should apply to
all - that the body with many personalities should be respon-
sible for the actions and commitments of all the personalities.
Otherwise the burden on the defendant of determining the
psychological condition of his partner would be too great.88
Third, the rights of the victim who has MPD can conflict
with the right of the accused to a fair trial. In Johnson,89 the
judge stopped, on the grounds of the rape shield laws, 9° the
defense attorney's attempt to question Sarah and her other
personalities about their prior sexual experiences and about
allegations that one of the personalities had in the past gone to
bars to drink and pick up men.9' Such information, while
irrelevant as to whether or not the defendant knew of Sarah's
condition, could be relevant if the defendant did not know of
the victim's disorder. For example, if a defendant charged with
rape were to raise the issue of consent or prior sexual contact
with the victim, the sexual experiences of the victim's alter
personalities might be excluded by relevant rape shield laws.
In State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court,92 a woman93 filed
a motion requesting that her husband/victim be compelled to
make available to the defense "all of his past and present
medical records from any institution in any jurisdiction. ' 94 The
court held that under the Victim's Bill of Rights, 95 the victim
'normal' in each of her personality manifestations, yet, from a psychological
perspective, be unable to appraise the nature of her conduct." Id. at 874.
The court noted that this situation would be unfair to the defendant. Id.
87. A discussion of the statutory applications of rape, which would depend
on the jurisdiction, is beyond the scope of this Note.
88. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the concept of collective responsibility.
89. No. 90-CF-280 (Winnebago County Ct., Wis. Nov. 8, 1990). See supra
notes 65-72 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
90. FED. R. Evm. 412 (concerning the relevance of victim's past behavior
and prohibiting certain lines of inquiry about the victim's sexual past).
91. Sarah's Story, supra note 72, at Dl.
92. 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
93. The wife, accused of stabbing her husband, maintained that for 12
years the husband had suffered from MPD and that she had been the victim
of physical and mental abuse. Id. at 450. On the night of the assault, the
wife had contacted the police alleging that her husband was beating her. Id.
She further alleged that at the time she stabbed him, the victim was manifesting
a violent personality that had long resisted integration in therapy. Id.
94. Id. at 447.
95. The Victim's Bill of Rights is an amendment to the Arizona Consti-
tution providing that "[to] preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and
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may refuse to release medical records to the defense." The
court, however, modified the trial judge's order to an in camera
evaluation to determine which portions of the medical records
were essential to the self-defense and what the victim could
accurately remember and relate about the incident. 97 The court
held that restrictions under the Victim's Bill of Rights on the
defendant's access to information necessary for her defense must
be "proportionate to the interest of protecting the victim as
balanced against the defendant's fair trial." 98
When dealing with victims who have MPD, the interest in
protecting the victim must be balanced with the interest in
providing the defendant with a fair trial. The interest of a victim
with MPD in protection and privacy, however, is essentially the
same as any other victim's interest. Although the ramifications
for others may be different from those involving multiples, 99
any victim may suffer emotional and physical stress during a
trial, compounded by its accompanying publicity.1°° In essence,
the law treats the victim with multiple personalities no differently
than it does the victim who does not have multiple personalities,
in spite of the many potential problems with such an approach.
III. MULT LES AS DEFENDANTS
A. Purpose of Punishment
One of the basic premises of justice is that every individual
is responsible for their actions. In the case of a criminal defen-
due process, a victim of crime has a right ... To refuse an interview,
deposition or other discovery request by the defendant." ARiz. CONST, art.
II, §§ 2.1(A), 2.1(A)(5).
96. Romley, 836 P.2d. at 451.
97. Id. at 452.
98. Id. at 453. The court concluded:
[T]he Victim's Bill of Rights was appropriately amended to the
Arizona Constitution as a shield for victims of crimes .... How-
ever, the amendment should not be a sword in the hands of victims
to thwart a defendant's ability to effectively present a legitimate
defense. Nor should the amendment be a fortress behind which
prosecutors may isolate themselves from their constitutional duty
to afford a criminal defendant a fair trial.
Id. at 454 (citation omitted).
99. The stress of a trial can harm victims with multiple personality syn-
drome. Sarah, the victim in State v. Johnson, apparently fragmented further.
The number of her personalities increased from 18 to 46 after the case was
publicized. Moss, supra note 65, at 2A.
100. Victims with MPD are just as likely to attempt to profit from the
surrounding publicity as non-Multiple victims. Sarah had a contract, later
rescinded, to sell her life experience to the media. Presser, supra note 65, at
20. Countless television movies have been based on the lives of victims. See,
e.g., I Can Make You Love Me: The Stalking of Laura Black (CBS television
broadcast, Feb. 9, 1993).
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dant, the law punishes'01 when the government, representing the
people, proves that the defendant broke society's laws. The
American legal system emphasizes that the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
The axiom that it is better to free a guilty person than to punish
an innocent one pervades our entire criminal justice system.
This premise, however, inherently conflicts with punishing a
Multiple who commits a crime. 02 Consider, for example, this
hypothetical situation. Elizabeth, age twenty-five, has multiple
personalities: Beth is a demure, shy fourteen-year-old, and Liz
is a conniving, violent twenty-one-year-old. One night when Liz
is in control, she brutally murders a young man. Elizabeth, who
had nothing to do with the crime and did not even know that
it occurred, is placed on trial. 03 If Elizabeth is treated as a
unified individual, 0 4 she should be punished for the crimes her
body committed. Elizabeth and Beth, however, are innocent of
Liz's crime, and punishing them for Liz's actions seems to
violate the premise that our society punishes only the guilty.
But the three personalities cannot be separated, and therefore
either the innocent will be punished or the guilty will be set
free. 105
101. In considering punishment, the term must be defined. For the purpose
of this section, punishment means imprisonment unless otherwise specified.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that incarceration, even in prison, is
not necessarily punishment. Saks, supra note 20, at 416; see also United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987) (concerning the constitutionality of
pre-trial detention). But, the Court has noted that there are circumstances in
which detention can constitute punishment. Id.
Burdening one person through the incarceration of another is not punish-
ment. Saks, supra note 20, at 416-17. Imprisonment of an individual, for
instance, frequently burdens his or her family both financially and emotionally,
but this does not constitute punishment of the family in the eyes of the law.
Id. Saks argued that punishment occurs when society and the individual believe
that the individual is being punished. Id.
102. See generally Pamela Hediger, Note, Mens Rea: The Impasse of Law
and Psychiatry, 26 GoNz. L. REv. 613, 621-23 (1991) (arguing that Freudian
psychologists' reliance on determinism conflicts with the theory that crime
stems from a choice to do wrong); Perlin, supra note 63, at 673-706 (contrasting
the free will-driven legal system with the determinative psychiatric view).
103. This is essentially the same question as whether both Siamese twins
should be imprisoned if one commits a murder despite the fact that they are
distinct individuals and one of them is innocent. Saks, supra note 20, at 414-
15.
104. For the purpose of this hypothetical, the reader should ignore all issues
of sanity and competency for all three personalities.
105. See generally Robert J. Lipkin, Free Will, Responsibility and the
Promise of Forensic Psychiatry, 13 INT'L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 331 (1990)
(arguing that if an individual is autonomous, then the individual is responsible
for his or her actions).
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One reason for incarcerating or detaining the perpetrator is
to protect society. Although the innocent personalities would
also be burdened, one could argue that the duty to protect
society - and hence free it from the burden of potential danger
to an innocent victim - from the dangerous personality is
greater than the duty to keep the innocent personalities from
being burdened by incarceration or detention.106 When compar-
ing the rights of the many in society who are at risk from the
dangerous aspect with the injustice of imprisoning an innocent
aspect, the danger to the group at large is apparently greater
than the unfairness to the few personalities.
The purpose of punishment must be considered before at-
tempting to resolve this conflict. Traditionally, the purposes of
punishment have been defined as: deterrence, °7 rehabilitation, 10
reprobation, °9 and retribution." 0 Punishing Elizabeth and Beth
for the actions of Liz seems to have limited deterrent value.
Given that Liz may simply remove herself after sentencing and
leave Elizabeth and Beth to suffer,"' the deterrent value to Liz
is limited as well: because she is not there, she is not being
punished. Therefore, deterrence from future violent behavior is
an unlikely result of punishing the Multiple in this case. Reha-
bilitation also is unlikely to be successful because if Liz, who
needs rehabilitation, removes herself, she leaves Elizabeth and
106. Saks, supra note 20, at 415.
107. Deterrence would discourage both the defendant and others from
violating the law in the future. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Theories of
Punishment and the External Standard, in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra
note 52, at 27, 32 (suggesting that the real purpose of criminal law and
punishment is simply to coerce individuals to conform their behavior to the
social conventions).
108. See generally KATHERINE W. ELLISON & ROBERT BUCKHOUT, PSYCHOL-
OGY AND CRIMINAL JusTcE 240-62 (1981) (evaluating the success of the prison
system in rehabilitation); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law,
in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 52, at 61 (arguing against a primarily
rehabilitative theory of punishment in criminal law).
109. Reprobation is society's need to "give vent to its feeling of horror,
revulsion or disapproval." It is the motivation behind laws such as those
prohibiting suicide, which have no real reformatory effects or deterrent value.
Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, in CRIME, LAW, AND
SOcIETY, supra note 52, at 35, 54-56.
110. Id. at 47-49 (noting that vengeance is traditionally a powerful reason
for punishment).
111. One psychologist described a patient on trial for conspiring to kill her
husband. The personality who was the actual culprit alleged that the whole
conspiracy was a joke. BLISS, supra note 13, at 134. The guilty personality
became frightened at the idea of jail and protested: "If she [the host person-
ality] goes to prison, do I have to go, too? ... I'm not going to prison...
she can go, but I won't.... I'm leaving." Id.
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Beth to unnecessary rehabilitation, unnecessary because they
committed no crime.
Reprobation, when applied to the defendant with multiple
personalities, needs to be considered in light if its purpose. If
society punishes the perpetrator to express its displeasure with
her actions, the question is to whom that displeasure is meant
to be expressed. If it is to the world at large as a method of
showing the country's level of civility, then the perpetrator,
Multiple or not, should be punished to fulfill that purpose.
Under that theory, the crime must be punished regardless of
whether the subject of punishment is the guilty body or the
guilty personality. If the displeasure is directed at the perpetra-
tor, then multiple or not, Liz should be punished - even if she
is able to vanish from it all. Reprobation expresses displeasure
at the commission of a crime, so society should punish the only
tangible alternative to the criminal personality, the body housing
the personality, to achieve that purpose." 2
Retribution is profoundly disturbing when applied to the
multiple defendant. Retribution is society's way of balancing a
wrong." 3 Does the punishment balance the crime if it includes,
in essence, innocent bystanders as well as the criminal? Or does
that push the state too far the other way and into the realm of
tyranny? The problem with punishing Multiples is upon whom
vengeance should be exacted.
In answering these questions, one should consider the concept
of personhood." 4 If person is defined by physical being - one
body, one person" 5 - then a Multiple is one person, indivisible.
Therefore, retribution is perfectly just." 6 If, however, person is
112. Contra Saks, supra note 20, at 418, 427.
113. See Cohen, supra note 109, at 47-49. Cohen argues that while this
concept of a cosmic balance sheet has inherent flaws - does taking the life
of a killer really balance the loss of the victim's life? - revenge is also an
innate element in humanity. Id. Without a criminal system that responded to
this need, people would dispense justice on their own. Id. at 49.
114. See Slovenko, supra note 23, at 681 ("Multiple personalities in one
human body seems bizarre, if not silly .... yet the psychological reality of
multiple or subpersonalities in one person is undeniable."). But see Ross,
supra note 4, at 61 ("MPD is not a fantastic curiosity in which there is more
than one person in the same body. There is only one person, an abuse victim
who has imagined that there are other people inside her in order to survive.").
115. The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity proposes that the continued
existence of one's brain defines identity - if the body and brain are the same
as the body and brain 10 years later, then it is the same person, regardless of
what kinds of extreme physical and psychological changes there have been.
Saks, supra note 20, at 404.
116. One commentator justified retribution as the objective in punishing
Multiples:
The law is based on the idea of a person as a unity. Whateverhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/12
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defined as a psychological being," 7 based on memory, experi-
ences, perceptions, attitudes, and affect, then a Multiple is many
people housed within the same body. Intuitively, retribution
seems less just if we adopt the definition of a person as a
psychological being.
The punishment of many for the sins of a few is at least as
old as the Bible," 8 and the concept continues into the twentieth
century in theories like collective responsibility.' '9 When Cain
inquired whether he was his brother's keeper, 20 he might well
have been Elizabeth asking if she is responsible for the actions
of Liz. Under the theory of collective responsibility, the answer
is yes. Because Elizabeth and Beth are so closely entangled with
Liz, and because what effects one, effects all, they are respon-
sible for each other's actions and retribution would be just.'2'
the psychological validity, legal theory requires that we regard
ourselves as unitary; otherwise the world would be unmanageable.
Ultimately a person must take responsibility for his or her sub-
personalities, if for no other reason than that in all cases of
multiple personality, the host personality is dominant.
Slovenko, supra note 23, at 707 (footnote omitted).
117. The Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity defines a person as
an entity with a continuity of memories and other psychological connectedness.
Saks, supra note 20, at 404.
118. See Genesis 3:1-24 (recounting the original sin that all descendants of
Adam and Eve must suffer because Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit);
Genesis 4:8-16 (banishing Cain for killing Abel and marking Cain and his
descendants).
119. Cohen, supra note 109, at 46. One example of successful application
of collective responsibility occurred after World War I, when Germany was
forced to pay reparations to nations it conquered while the Nazis were in
power. Their children carried that debt, despite the fact that they did not
participate in the invasions. Id. See also Andrew E. Lelling, Comment,
Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PENN.
L. Rav. 1471, 1552-60 (1993) (discussing how Multiples should be held to the
standard of collective responsibility based in part on a neurobiological analysis
of their condition).
120. Genesis 4:9.
121. Multiples themselves have commented on their situation. A Multiple
charged with bank robbery in Florida said she was "willing to take respon-
sibility and emphasize[d] that she [did] not want to go back into society" for
fear that she would commit more crimes. Radwin, supra note 63, at 351-52,
373.
In another case, the Multiple, Mr. A., was charged with murdering his
girlfriend. Irwin N. Perr, Crime and Multiple Personality Disorder: A Case
History and Discussion, 19 BULL. Am. AcAD. PsYcHiATRY & L. 203 (1991).
Mr. A. saw the only options for removing the violent alter, Billy Ray, as
"the death penalty, life in prison, life in a prison hospital, or suicide. He
added, 'From what I've been told, Billy Ray has done the killing. Someone
has to pay the penalty.... The lesser of the three [alternatives] would be the
death penalty."' Id. at 207.
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B. The Role of Multiple Personalities in a Criminal Defense
When a criminal defendant has multiple personality disor-
der,'12 her condition can play many roles in the defense strat-
egy. 123 The defendant's sanity is at issue from the time the crime
is committed to the time the sentence is served. The disorder'2 4
also may be relevant in other ways. 125
One question is whether the very condition of MPD renders
the defendant incompetent to stand trial. 26 Generally, to be
competent, the defendant must be (1) capable of understanding
that he is in a court of law and the purpose of the proceeding
against him;127 (2) able to understand his own status as a
defendant with reference to the trial;1H and (3) able to assist in
conducting his defense. 29
122. See generally Allison, supra note 15, at 188-89 (suggesting methods
for the forensic psychologist to use in evaluating the condition of a defendant
who may be a Multiple).
123. Some experts question whether different personalities should have
separate legal counsel and make separate pleas and arguments. Slovenko, supra
note 23, at 699. See also generally Allison, supra note 15, at 188 (defining
guidelines for handling one who is believed to have multiple personalities as
a defendant in court).
124. Simply diagnosing the Multiple defendant can be difficult if the various
personalities refuse to speak to the forensic psychologist or refuse to take
psychological tests. Allison, supra note 15, at 185-86.
125. See State v. Moore, 550 A.2d 117, 141 (N.J. 1988) (concluding that
the trial court's failure to explain the diminished capacity defense to the jury
was reversible error when the defendant was a Multiple); Slovenko, supra note
23, at 700-01 (noting various legal problems Multiples have including issues
surrounding the death penalty and making contracts).
126. See generally Ronald Roesch, Determining Competency to Stand Trial:
An Examination of Evaluation Procedures in an Institutional Setting, 47 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 542 (1979) (examining the methods mental
health officials use to determine competency).
127. Alfred P. French & Bryan R. Shechmeister, The Multiple Personality
Syndrome and Criminal Defense, 11 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 17,
20 (1983) (describing the California rule).
128. Id. at 20. See also Lowery v. United States, 956 F.2d 227 (11th Cir.
1992) (evaluating the proprieties of a habeas remedy for a defendant with
MPD who was sentenced based on a prior conviction that the defendant
claimed should be overturned because he was unable to make a reasoned and
intelligent plea); de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) (affirming the jury's finding that the defendant's
MPD did not substantially impair his ability to make a reasoned plea).
129. French & Shechmeister, supra note 127, at 20. The New Jersey rule is
similar: the defendant must comprehend (1) that he is in a court of law and
charged with a crime; (2) that a judge is on the bench; (3) that the prosecutor
will try to convict him; (4) that the defense attorney will help defend him; (5)
that he must tell the truth if he takes the stand; (6) that the jury will weigh
the evidence and determine whether he should be convicted or acquitted; (7)
the substance of the plea negotiations; and (8) the defendant must have the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/12
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE LAW
The primary problem with Multiples as defendants is that if
an alter personality committed the crime, the host personality
may not remember the crime. This amnesia could hinder the
defendant's ability to assist in his or her defense because of the
inability to supply details about the crime and the events leading
up to the crime. Courts have generally held that amnesia is not
a bar to competency. 130 Therefore, a Multiple is not incompetent
to stand trial merely because the host personality does not recall
anything about the crime.
Having Multiple defendants take the stand during the trial
presents the danger of other personalities appearing. 3' The alter
personality may be unaware of what is going on and what has
been said previously. In State v. Badger,3 2 however, the New
Jersey court, in response to that very concern, concluded that
defense counsel could explain to the defendant what had oc-
curred prior to the personality change.'33
Defendants with MPD have attempted to convince the courts
that the syndrome causes them to act involuntarily and that,
therefore, they cannot be held responsible for the acts of their
alter personalities. 34 In State v. Grimsley,'35 the defendant, who
had been convicted of drunk driving,3 6 argued that she could
not be held liable for any offense because she was disassociated
from her host personality (Robin) and under control of an alter
ability to participate adequately in the preparation of his defense. N.J. STAT.
ArN. § 2C:4-4b(2) (West 1982), cited in State v. Badger, 551 A.2d 207, 208
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
130. See, e.g., People v. McBroom, 70 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329 (Cal. Ct. App.
1968), cited in French & Shechmeister, supra note 127, at 20. See also Badger,
551 A.2d at 209-10.
131. Because personalities can change in a dramatic manner, the shift can
be embarrassing in the courtroom. French & Shechmeister, supra note 127, at
17. In one civil trial, however, the Multiple plaintiff took the stand and shifted
personalities throughout the testimony. Dan Turner, Multiple Ending to Trial
of Unusual Suit, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1993, at A22. The trial raised the
ethical issues regarding what weight a jury should place on testimony from a
person with MPD. The plaintiff, who had more than 40 personalities, sued a
former counselor and pastor for civil damages stemming from allegedly coerced
sexual relations. Id. In another case, three of a defendant's personalities were
sworn in separately before testifying. Ben Macintyre, Schizophrenic Puts Other
Selves On Trial, THE TwS (London), Jan. 6, 1994, at 11. For more on the
confusion over the use of the terms "schizophrenic" and "multiple person-
ality," see supra note 23.
132. 551 A.2d 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
133. Id. at 209.
134. See Kirby v. State, 410 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the
Multiple defendant's argument that an alter ego committed the crime and that
he could not be held responsible for the acts of the alter personality).
135. 444 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
136. Id. at 1073.
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personality (Jennifer) at the time of her offense. 3 7 She contended
that Robin was unaware of and unable to control or recall
Jennifer's actions. 3 8 The defendant maintained that Robin was
not conscious of what was happening at the time of the crime,
so she could not be held responsible for involuntary acts.' 39 The
court disagreed, holding that the personality that committed the
act maintained responsibility for her actions.Y0
Defendants with MPD, if found competent to stand trial,
often try to establish their legal insanity.' 4' Multiple personality
defendants differ from other defendants trying to establish in-
sanity because of the issue of which personality needs to be
found insane to establish legal insanity - the host personality,
each alter personality, 4 2 or only the personality who committed
the crime. 43 In Kirkland v. State,' 4 the defendant was convicted
137. Id. at 1075.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The court stated:
[T]here was only one person driving the car and only one person
accused of drunken driving. It is immaterial whether she was in
one state of consciousness or another, so long as in the personality
then controlling her behavior, she was conscious and her actions
were a product of her own volition.
Id. at 1075-76. Grimsley's conviction was reversed, however, because the trial
court erred in denying her request for a jury trial. Id. at 1076.
141. For a full discussion of the history of the insanity defense and the
various tests, see supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. Some multiple
personality defendants do plead not guilty by reason of insanity. A man
charged with rape and theft pled not guilty by reason of insanity because he
claimed to have MPD. Rape Excuse: 15 Persons in One Man, CHI. TRm.,
.fan. 5, 1994, at 12N.
142. See State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 618 (Haw.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1078 (1984) (noting the trend of examining the sanity of each alter
personality, or at least the alter personality who committed the crime).
In another case, at a hearing regarding an insanity plea by a Multiple
defendant, an expert psychiatrist testified that there were two approaches to
evaluating the sanity of a multiple: the "global" approach, which looks to
the sanity of the host personality, and the "specific alter" approach, which
evaluates the sanity of the alter personality in charge at the time of the offense.
State v. Wheaton, 850 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. 1993). The court refused to
decide which approach should be used. Id. at 512. The Tenth Circuit, however,
has held that the global approach is acceptable when the evidence indicates
that the host, but not the alter personality, was insane. United States v.
Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1993).
143. See Rodrigues, 679 P.2d at 620-21 (noting that MPD does not per se
call for. an acquittal and that the question of sanity is a matter for the jury
or trier of fact to decide). But cf. Saks, supra note 20, at 459 (concluding
that courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that defendants with MPD
are not responsible for their crimes).
144. 304 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
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of bank robbery. She unsuccessfully pled not guilty by reason
of insanity, and she appealed the verdict of guilty but mentally
ill. 45 The trial judge accepted that the defendant had MPD, but
ruled that whichever personality robbed the banks did so with
"rational, purposeful criminal intent and with knowledge that
it was wrong."'" The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 147
Several difficulties arise when arguing that a multiple person-
ality defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. First, diag-
nosis of Multiples often stems from interviews in which the
defendant is hypnotized or drugged with sodium amytal.'" Some
courts refuse to accept testimony resulting from either of these
methods. 4 9 Furthermore, often the only way the core personality
becomes aware of the other personalities and the facts of the
crime is through these enhanced interviews. Courts have grappled
with the issue of whether these witnesses and defendants should
be allowed to testify about the contents of the interviews and
conclusions based on those interviews."10 Second, whenever a
145. Id. at 563.
146. Id. at 565.
147. According to the Kirkland court, "[Tihe law adjudges criminal liability
of the person according to the person's state of mind at the time of the act;
we will not begin to parcel criminal accountability out among the various
inhabitants of the mind." Id. at 564.
148. Sodium amytal is a barbiturate with sedative and hypnotic capabilities.
It is commonly used to treat insomnia and in preparation for surgery.
LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES
§ 23.13 (Charles J. Frankel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1983). For more on the use of
sodium amytol in procuring testimony, see supra note 44.
149. See Parker v. State, 606 S.W.2d 746 (Ark. 1980) (holding that the trial
court erred in refusing to permit a psychiatric expert to testify on cross-
examination about an interview with the Multiple defendant under sodium
amytal because the American Psychiatric Association recognizes the drug as
a useful tool in diagnosing and treating MPD); State v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that interviews based on hypnosis
are acceptable if the proponent can establish an acceptable level of reliability);
State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036
(1990) (holding that videotape of sessions taken when the defendant was under
hypnosis and injected with sodium pentothal, the so-called "truth serum,"
was properly excluded); State v. Jones, 743 P.2d 276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)
(allowing testimony based on an amobarbital interview with the defendant);
see also Slovenko, supra note 23, at 691-92 (noting that most states will admit
the testimony of a hypnotized witness only with clear and convincing evidence
that the testimony is offered based on facts recalled and related before
hypnosis).
150. See United States v. Manley, 893 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 901 (1990) (concluding that the district court properly excluded
psychologist's opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b));
United States v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219
(1988) (concluding that under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), psychiatrists
can testify regarding their opinions on whether or not a Multiple can under-
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defendant invokes the insanity defense, a battle of the experts,
is inevitable, ending only when the money runs out. 52 Because
the very existence of MPD is controversial in the psychological
community, the debate over the use of experts is complicated
further.53
When a defendant invokes the insanity defense, suspicion
immediately arises that the defendant is malingering5 4 in order
to get an acquittal. 5 5 Because MPD 156 is so out of the ordinary
stand their own actions). See generally David Cohen, Note, Punishing the
Insane: Restriction of Expert Psychiatric Testimony By Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 704(b), 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 541 (1988) (arguing that Rule 704(b) should
be abolished).
151. Although the majority of witnesses who testify regarding the compe-
tency or sanity of the defendant are psychological experts (who qualify under
rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as experts who can give opinion
testimony), lay witnesses also can testify under Rule 701 regarding their opinion
as to whether the defendant is a Multiple. FED. R. oF EvID. 701. In People
v. Wade, 750 P.2d 794 (Cal.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988), a lay witness
was permitted to testify that she believed the defendant, Melvin Wade, was
Multiple because he had told her that his name was Othello Metheen (the
personality who Wade maintained had committed the murder) and that Othello
was an assassin. Id. at 798.
152. Some people have criticized the insanity plea because it seems to be
'the defense of the rich. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 51, at 273. The parents of
John Hinckley, Jr. spent between $500,000 and $1,000,000 on psychiatric
evaluations and testimony. Id.
153. See Wade, 750 P.2d at 798-99 (describing the battle of experts in which
the defense experts said the defendant clearly was Multiple and the prosecution
experts said the defendant clearly was malingering). See also Ralph B. Allison,
The Possession Syndrome on Trial, AMi. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 46, 47-55
(1985) (evaluating Melvin Wade and concluding that Wade suffered from
Possession Syndrome rather than MPD).
154. Malingering of MPD, according to one expert, is usually more a part
of the defendant's legal strategy rather than the appearance of a separate
undefined illness that manifests itself by presenting false personalities. Ross,
supra note 4, at 73-76.
155. See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) (holding that when
the defendant claimed he had MPD and pled insanity, the trial court should
have explained to the jury the difference between not guilty by reason of
insanity and guilty but mentally ill and the ramifications of each, because
juries often equate not guilty by reason of insanity with release and freedom).
See generally Nicholas Anthony, Malingering as Role Taking, 32 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 32 (1976) (discussing the ability of nonmaladjusted individuals to
simulate maladjustment on psychological tests); Richard Rogers & James L.
Cavanaugh, "Nothing But the Truth".. . A Reexamination of Malingering,
11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443 (1983) (evaluating the purposes of malingering
and the possible reasons for it).
156. According to the DSM-III-R, malingering of multiple personality dis-
order "can present a difficult diagnostic dilemma, which often can be resolved
only by obtaining additional data from ancillary sources, such as hospital and
police records and family members, employers, and friends." DSM-III-R,
supra note 7, at 272. There is speculation that such a caution was included
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and bizarre,5 7 when the defendant maintains that she is not
guilty by reason of insanity because of MPD, that suspicion is
further heightened. Although some defendants have successfully
pled not guilty by reason of insanity because of MPD,5 8 others
have not. 59
in the DSM-III-R after the discussion of MPD but not with the other
definitions because of the controversy surrounding the very diagnosis of MPD.
Ross, supra note 4, at 157. According to Ross, the warning is partly to "send
out a signal that specialists in dissociation are nobody's fools," and that as
the diagnosis is more widely accepted, the warning will become less prominent
in future editions of the Manual. Id.
157. See generally State v. Woodard, 404 S.E.2d 6, 10 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991) (noting that the defense counsel chose not to put the defendant's alter
personality on the stand because the attorney feared that the jury would
perceive it as a "Hollywood ploy").
158. Billy Milligan was the first person found not guilty by reason of
insanity on the basis of MPD. Saks, supra note 20, at 387 n. 11 (citing DANIEL
KEYES, THE MINDs OF BILLY MLIGAN xi (1981)). In 1978, the 23-year-old
Ohio man was acquitted by reason of insanity on nine charges of rape,
kidnapping, and aggravated assault. Slovenko, supra note 23, at 693. Ten
personalities emerged; several of whom took part in the rapes. ALDRIDGE-
MoIs, supra note 12, at 8. Arthur, the facilitator who was aware of all of
the personalities, planned the rapes; Ragen, the aggressive "keeper of hate,"
initiated the assaults; and Adelena, a 19-year-old lesbian, committed the rapes.
Id. at 8-9. At the trial for the rapes, the judge found that Milligan could not
tell right from wrong nor control his behavior and called Milligan's history
"mind-boggling." Slovenko, supra note 23, at 693. Milligan was subsequently
confined to a maximum security prison hospital. ALDRIIGE-MORRIS, supra
note 12, at 9. In 1988, he was discharged to outpatient status. Radwin, supra
note 63, at 358 n.57. For a detailed look at Milligan's case, see DANIEL KEYES,
THE MINDS OF BILLY MILLIGAN (1981).
159. Kenneth Bianchi, the "Hillside Strangler," was convicted of murder
after the judge concluded that Bianchi was faking MPD and was therefore
ineligible for the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Ross, supra note
4, at 49. In 1978, police found the naked bodies of eight young women who
had been raped and strangled. ALDRmDGE-MomIs, supra note 12, at 17. Some
of them were found displayed on hillsides, earning the murderer his nickname.
Id. Bianchi eventually was arrested in 1979 for the murder of two college
women in Bellingham, Washington. John G. Watkins, The Bianchi (L.A.
Hillside Strangler) Case: Sociopath or Multiple Personality?, 32 INT'L. J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosls 67, 67 (1984). During police interrogation
and psychiatric interviews, Bianchi confessed to being the Hillside Strangler.
Id. At trial, six experts testified as to whether Bianchi was sane. Because the
experts reached several different conclusions, the case casts doubt on the
ability of forensic psychologists to offer opinions to the degree of reasonable
or probable medical certainty that the courts require. Perr, supra note 121,
at 213.
Three of the experts who examined Bianchi have presented major papers,
each of which arrives at different conclusions. Watkins, the first, concluded
that Bianchi really did have multiple personalities. Watkins, supra, at 94-95.
The defense had Watkins interview Bianchi in an attempt to fill in the blackouts
Bianchi had at the times he allegedly committed the murders. Id. at 67-68.
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There are several common misperceptions about not guilty by
reason of insanity verdicts. 160 First, such pleas are in fact rela-
Watkins questioned the hypnotized defendant about a "part of Ken" to which
Watkins had not spoken. Id. at 70-71; see supra note 26 for a discussion of
the possibility that multiple personalities can manifest themselves after a
hypnotic suggestion. In response to Watkins' question, "Steve" appeared and
admitted committing all of the murders with the help of Bianchi's cousin.
Watkins, supra, at 71-72. Steve claimed that Ken had no idea that Steve
existed. Id. Rorschach experts who did not know that Ken and Steve were
ostensibly the same person concluded that different people took the Rorschach
tests, and that Steve was violent and dangerous while Ken was perfectly
normal. Id. at 76-77. By the end of 1979, Ken became convinced that he had
committed the crimes and pled guilty to murder on seven counts. Id. at 83.
In exchange for testimony against his cousin, he was sentenced to life impris-
onment rather than death. Id.
The prosecution's expert, Dr. Martin T. Orne, concluded that Bianchi in
fact suffered from anti-social personality and that he deliberately feigned
multiple personalities. Orne, supra note 14, at 118. Orne noted that in the
year before his arrest, Bianchi had styled himself a psychologist (which he
was not) and even convinced his common-law wife that he was one. Id. at
127. Orne doubted that Bianchi was ever actually hypnotized, noting incon-
sistencies in Bianchi's "hypnotized" behavior compared with that of others.
Id. at 131-41. Orne further cited the appearance of a third personality that
revealed himself only after the clinician told Bianchi that true Multiples have
at least three personalities. Id. at 142-43. Orne's Rorschach experts concluded
that one sociopathic individual took the tests. Id. at 150. Orne concluded that
Bianchi was feigning multiple personality and that he was sane when he
committed the murders. Id. at 161.
The court-appointed expert, Dr. Ralph B. Allison, concluded that Bianchi
had atypical dissociative disorder and mixed personality disorder. In layman's
terms, although he was not Multiple, he was not deliberately simulating MPD.
Ralph B. Allison, Difficulties Diagnosing the Multiple Personality Syndrome
in a Death Penalty Case, 32 INT'L J. CNicALL & EXPERMENTAL HYPNOSIS
102, 116 (1984). Allison concluded that all of the personalities Bianchi mani-
fested had been present in his mind, but had not crystallized until the hypnosis
began. Id. at 111. He concluded that Bianchi was not Multiple, based on
inconsistencies between Bianchi and Allison's Multiple patients. Id. at 112.
For example, Ken and Steve had the same attitude toward school. If they
were truly separate personalities, the attitudes should have been different.
Furthermore, Bianchi reported numerous friends throughout his childhood;
friends whom Steve would have driven away had he been present. Id. Allison
noted that Bianchi's story supported an insanity plea but no evidence short
of the hypnotized interviews suggested that he had multiple personalities. Id.
at 115. Allison concluded that although Bianchi's urges to rape and kill came
from repressed unconscious conflicts, that "concept does not justify an excuse
from legal sanctions." Id.
The Hillside strangler case illustrates how difficult the diagnosis of MPD
can be and how experts can confidently disagree with each other about its
manifestations.
160. Public reaction to verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, especially
in publicized cases such as the John Hinckley, Jr. trial tends towards outrage
and shock. Low, supra note 61, at 117, 126.
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tively rare, and verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity are
even rarer.' 61 Even when found not guilty by reason of insanity,
defendants usually spend as much time in mental hospitals' 62 as
a defendant would have spent in prison had the verdict been
guilty. 63 A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is not
necessarily better for the defendant than a conviction in terms
of length of confinement.
As the battles of the experts demonstrates, mental health
experts are divided on the subject of whether MPD can be faked
successfully.'6 Such differences of opinion lead to conflicts in
the courtroom between the experts, leaving the jury to determine
whether the defendant is malingering. 65 More often than not,
the trier of fact concludes that despite - or because of - the
testimony of various experts, the defendant is malingering. '6
161. In 1979, defendants pled not guilty by reason of insanity in 102 of
22,102 felony cases in Wyoming. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 51, at 271. Of
those pleas, only one succeeded. Id.
162. Another issue regarding defendants with MPD is who pays for special
therapy if the defendant is committed or convicted. See Kort v. Carlson, 723
P.2d 143 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the courts cannot hold the state liable
for the costs of a private therapist for a Multiple who was found incompetent
to stand trial, absent a finding that the state hospitals were unable to treat
him); State Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Stoutamire, 602 So.2d 564
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a patient found not guilty by reason
of insanity could force the state to pay for a private hospital that was
experienced with the disorder if no public hospital had such experience).
163. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 51, at 270. A 1983 study found that periods
of hospitalization for those acquitted by reason of insanity tended to increase
depending upon the seriousness of the crime committed. Id. at 272. The
possibility exists, however, that the individual will be "cured" and released.
See, e.g., id. at 272-73. For this reason, one expert asserted that "the condition
[is] a questionable basis for a finding of nonresponsibility." Perr, supra note
121, at 213.
164. See Orne, supra note 14, at 120 (discussing the possibility of faking
MPD). Orne stated:
So striking are the behavioral differences between personalities
that the assertion is often made that one would need to have the
dramatic skills of Sarah Bernhardt or Sir Laurence Olivier, along
with a detailed knowledge of psychiatry, to effectively simulate
such radically different persons .... For these reasons, it has been
argued that the successful malingering of a multiple personality
disorder is unlikely, if not impossible.
Id. Yet Watkins, an expert on multiple personalities, believed that the Hillside
Strangler was Multiple, and Orne disagreed. See supra note 158.
165. See State v. Darnall, 614 P.2d 120 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). The court
noted that although it is possible for proof of mental disease to be so
overwhelming that the trial court could find as a matter of law that the
defendant was not responsible for his actions, usually the jury can choose
whether or not to believe the experts and determine if the defendant has MPD.
Id. at 123.
166. Although defendants plead not guilty by reason of insanity in roughly
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The defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity thus
has even less incentive for malingering.
IV. PROPOSAL
Multiple personality disorder is a complex and confusing
mental illness. Aside from raising a number of psychological
problems and debates, the syndrome creates a philosophical
quandary for the criminal justice system. To counter the prob-
lems raised by victims and defendants with MPD, this Note
proposes the following model.
When a Multiple is the victim of a crime, for all legal
purposes, the victim generally should not be treated differently
from other victims. The victim with MPD is essentially in the
same position as other victims. Although the stress of a trial
and any surrounding publicity could aggravate the Multiple
victim's condition, non-Multiple victims could also suffer severe
emotional or physical difficulties resulting' from the stress and
publicity of trial. Victims with MPD, with the aid of those who
advise them, must decide individually whether they are willing
and able to endure the trauma of trial, just as any other victim
must do.
The one special difficulty concerning victims with MPD occurs
when the victim testifies. If the prosecution concludes that the
victim should testify in court, then the Multiple victim must be
treated somewhat differently than other victims. The judge must
decide on an individual basis whether each of the testifying
personalities is competent to testify. If the judge finds the
personalities competent, each should be sworn in. The trier of
fact then can weigh the credibility of evidence each personality
gives. If alter personalities suddenly appear while the victim is
testifying, the judge should allow the attorney, if necessary, to
explain the situation to the alter personality.
With regard to other legal issues such as rape shield laws, the
judge should decide on a case-by-case basis what appropriate
protections should be afforded to the victim without jeopardizing
the constitutional rights of the defendant. Again, Multiple vic-
tims should be treated exactly as other victims.
When a Multiple is the perpetrator of a crime, the law should
treat the body as a whole, with each personality responsible for
the actions of the other personalities. 6 7 Otherwise, the legal
two percent of all cases, if a crime is particularly heinous, the jury is likely
to find the defendant guilty despite the evidence of insanity. Caryl E. Boehnert,
Psychological and Demographic Factors Associated with Individuals Using the
Insanity Defense, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 28 (1985).
167. [U]sing MPD as a tactic on this perverse playing field, which wehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/12
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implications of recognizing each personality as a separate person
and not recognizing collective responsibility would dictate that
every Multiple defendant be acquitted.
To avoid such a scenario, when the defendant alleges that
they suffer from MPD, the issue of sanity should not be raised
until the conclusion of the trial. Indeed, for Multiple defendants,
the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity should not be
available if the basis of insanity is MPD. If the defendant is
acquitted, then the illness is irrelevant. If, however, the defen-
dant is convicted, a psychiatric evaluation is necessary to deter-
mine whether treatment would be helpful. If treatment has a
chance of success, then the defendant should be detained in a
prison hospital and receive treatment during the duration of the
sentence. When the sentence expires, defendants can only be
held against their will if that result is obtained during an
involuntary civil commitment proceeding. ' a
The process described above would avoid battles of the experts
and the problems such battles incur. It would bypass the current
debate of whether to look to the sanity of the core personality
or the alter personality in control at the time of the crime when
a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. It would
assure multiple defendants of treatment while simultaneously
fulfilling society's interest in punishing the perpetrator of a
crime. Finally, it would alleviate the courts duty to answer
unanswerable philosophical questions about the heart of person-
hood that stem from the very condition of multiple personality
disorder.
CONCLUSION
When society's rules are broken, society must punish the
perpetrator to prevent anarchy. Collective responsibility means
that the whole suffers for the sins of the parts, and that
theoretically the group will, in the future, control the actions
of the individual. In the case of multiple personality disorder,
the many are treated as one.
Sarah K. Fields*
call the legal system, may be good legal strategy, but it does not
teach patients how to take ownership of their lives or responsibility
for their actions. Therapists are misguided if they try to "help"
their MPD patients by telling the judge that the patient wasn't
responsible, on the grounds that an alter personality committed
the crime.
Ross, supra note 4, at 74.
168. See Ross, supra note 4, at 73-76 (advocating elimination of the insanity
defense).
* J.D. 1994, Washington University.
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